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A widely accepted result in the literature is that the majority of voters
are against the introduction of universal vouchers. Chen and West (2000)
predict that voters' attitudes towards selective vouchers (SV) may be dif-
ferent. They claim that voters are indi®erent between the no-voucher and
SV regimes, unless competition leads to a reduction in the education price.
I show that, when public schools are congested, the majority of voters are
in favour of SV. Furthermore, SV induces a Pareto improvement. In equili-
brium, the introduction of SV induces a reduction in income strati¯cation
at school, with some relatively poor students attending private schools.
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Most Western countries publicly provide private goods, such as education, ¯nanced
through taxes and o®ered to citizens at a lower-than-competitive price. Households
can choose between the public and private supplies; legal or technical reasons may
prevent households from consuming both simultaneously, a common assumption
in the education literature.
Consumers' preferred quality of instruction is heterogeneous. For equity rea-
sons, and because of the limited available resources, all students in a public school
receive the same service, regardless of their preferences. Some agents may prefer
private to public school for di®erent reasons (congested public schools, availability
in private schools of a broader variety of courses, etc.). Incentives to move to
the private sector increase agents' decisional space and can relax the public bud-
get constraint. Meanwhile, political support for a high-quality public service may
decrease when more people attend private schools.
Vouchers provide an incentive to attend private schools;1 their use was recently
implemented in a variety of countries (Chile was amongst the ¯rst; the Czech Re-
public one of the last). The introduction of vouchers often encounters strong
ideological opposition;2 I use a political economy model to investigate how citi-
zens would perceive the introduction of a voucher system. A voting model seems
appropriate to forecast how voters would perceive changes in the level of taxation
and the use of vouchers.3
The idea behind the model is that public school students receive a sub-optimal
level of instruction. A voucher allowing them to attend a private school induces
some voters to opt out of the public sector and choose the optimal budget share to
devote to education. Proposing a voucher of value below the cost of public school
students relaxes public budget constraint, when only people that would otherwise
attend public school are entitled to use it. By revealed preferences, people opting
out of the public sector are better o®. The new budget allows for an increase in
the quality of public school and a reduction of the tax burden, making all voters
better o®.
A broad part of the literature concludes that vouchers do not improve welfare
1Vouchers are either \universal" (everybody receives them) or \selective" (only a subset of
the population is eligible).
2See Card and Krueger (1992), Filer and Munich (2001), McEwan and Carnoy (2002) or
Chakrabarti (2008).
3I consider a direct voting model: with o±ce-motivated politicians, the choice of the legislator
coincides with the preferred policy by the majority of voters. See also Budge (2006).
1or that the majority of citizens are against their introduction (unless additional
concerns, such as peer e®ects, are introduced). I show that 1) their introduction
bene¯ts the majority of society; 2) an o±ce-motivated politician should be in
favour of their instauration; and 3) introducing vouchers can lead to a Pareto
improvement.
The literature on the political economy of education is extensive;4 Epple and
Romano (1996) is often the departure point (including in my contribution). Edu-
cation is a consumption good.5 Agents, who have heterogenous income, vote over
the tax rate to ¯nance public schools; di®erences in consumption are in terms of
quality. An equilibrium may fail to exist; Epple and Romano (1996) identify two
single crossing conditions that guarantee its existence: Slope Rising in Income
(SRI) and Slope Decreasing in Income (SDI).6 Under SRI, the \ends against the
middle" equilibrium implies that the richest and poorest households push to reduce
the tax, while the middle class does the opposite. Under SDI, the median voter is
decisive, and the poorest half of society forms a coalition against the richest half.
Vouchers are not considered.
Chen and West (2000) use Epple and Romano (1996)'s structure to compare
systems with universal, selective and no vouchers, under SDI. The median in-
come is the upper threshold for receiving selective vouchers of value equal to the
(constant) marginal cost of education. They conclude that the majority always
prefers the no-voucher model to the universal one. The decisive voter is indi®erent
between the selective and the no-voucher framework and there are no welfare dif-
ferences. The crucial assumptions are as follows: a) introducing vouchers does not
a®ect the market price; b) the value of the voucher is equal to the marginal cost
of a student; and c) only agents with income below the median are entitled to
vouchers. Section III in Chen and West (2000) acknowledges that an increase in
competition may lead to a fall in the market price or an increase in quality and,
thus, to an increase in welfare. This last result is in line with those of my paper.
Epple and Romano (1998) consider a universal vouchers model with students
di®ering in income and ability. They conclude that a majority of voters supports
universal vouchers and that vouchers reduce congestion. Their results rely on
4Stiglitz (1974) is one of the most well known. Other important contributions come from
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Blomquist and Christiansen (1999), Chen and West (2000),
De Fraja (2002), Gradstein and Justman (2002) and Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006). The
Handbook of the Economics of Education (2006) and Gradstein, Justman, and Meier (2005)
provide surveys of a consistent part of the recent literature on the ¯eld.
5See Dur and Glazer (2008).
6Footnote 8 and page 6 provide more details on these conditions.
2the presence of peer e®ects. Rich or skilled students attend private schools. A
minority of neither rich nor skilled students remains in public schools, where the
quality drops along with students' utility.
Similarly to Chen and West (2000), I consider selective vouchers as a possible
way to reduce congestion (reducing the price of private education, vouchers allow
some voters to consume it) and to increase quality in the public sector. The di®e-
rences in results with respect to Chen and West (2000) come from the attributes
of the vouchers: more people are entitled to use them and their value is below
the marginal cost of public school students. The market structure and the cost
function in my model are similar to those in Epple and Romano (1998).
Agents vote on the tax to ¯nance public schooling. The cost of public and
private education do not need to be the same. As in Chen and West (2000), I
do not consider peer e®ects,7 and I also focus on the SDI condition.8 Absent
vouchers, the results are identical to those in Epple and Romano (1996), which I
use as a benchmark. My model shows that, in the extreme case, the public sector
collapses when the share of public school students attracted by vouchers exceeds
a given threshold. In this case, a minority of the population may be worse o®. In
the more realistic case in which public education is not undermined, introducing
vouchers is Pareto improving.
The paper is divided into ¯ve sections. Section 2 describes the model, Section
3 illustrates the voting outcome without vouchers (benchmark case). Section 4
studies the e®ects of introducing vouchers, while Section 5 analyses the results of
the vote over the tax and show under which conditions selective vouchers induce
a Pareto improvement. The last section concludes.
2 The model
I consider a model with two normal goods: the numeraire b and education X:
1. Attendance to public and private schools are mutually exclusive. Subscript
7This is not just a simplifying assumption; despite the massive use of peer e®ects in the
literature, it is still unclear how peer e®ects operate and which impact they have. See, for
instance, Burke and Sass (2008), McEwan (2003), or Zimmerman (2003).
8It is unclear which of SDI and SRI is more likely. Justman. contrary to Epple and Romano,
suggest that SDI is more appropriate. The SDI (Slope Decreasing in Income) condition means
that agents' preferred tax decreases with income; it derives from a substitution e®ect that prevails
on the income e®ect (vice versa for SRI). SRI is more reasonable for countries where the living
conditions of the poorest citizens are dramatic in absolute terms (children tend not to attend
school). Thus, education has a small impact on poor people's utility. SDI is more appropriate
when poor people are rich enough to consider education as an investment.
3P indicates the public sector and R the private sector (e.g., XP and XR are
respectively the qualities of public and private education).
2. The mass of voters is normalised to 1. Each voter has a pupil of school
age. Voters type depends solely on income !, distributed with density f
on the support [!min;!max]. I assume the average (and aggregate) income
! =
R !max
!min !f(!)d! to be greater than the median one (!med).
3. Voters' utility function, U(X;b), is separable and strictly concave in X.9
4. The school cost function is convex in the number of students n: C(X;n) =
F +V (n)X, with V 0(n) ¸ 0 and V 00(n) ¸ 0. In particular, I assume V (n) =
c1n + c2(n)2; thus, the cost function is C(X;n) = F + (c1n + c2(n)2)X.10
5. The public sector is the dominant ¯rm, while the private sector is the compe-
titive fringe. The shape of the cost function is the same for both the public
and private sectors. Without loss of generality, I assume that only one public
institute is present.11 Each private school student decides the level of edu-
cational quality to purchase. Low barriers to entry ensure that the number
of students in each school adjusts to the e±cient scale (i.e., for each ¯rm i,
ni = argmin(
C(X;ni)
ni )). The quality of one unit of private education XR is
de¯ned in order to normalise the private sector's price to one.12
6. Public education is ¯nanced via a proportional income tax t paid by all
citizens and chosen through majority voting. Without loss of generality, I
suppose that the public budget constraint requires balancing only ordinary
(variable) costs and the proportional income tax proceeds.13
7. Tax proceeds are ¯rst used to ¯nance vouchers.14 The remaining resources
are shared equally among public school students (thus, all students attending
public school receive the same quality of education XP).
9This assumption is slightly more restrictive than necessary. It allows to simplify the sub-
sequent computations without a®ecting results and insights.
10Appendix A discusses this assumption.
11Equivalently, assume that public schools are of equal size and provide the same service.
12By the free entry assumption, the price of private school does not depend on the number of
students in the private sector. Chen and West (2000) arrives at the same conclusion through a
generic technology to produce education showing decreasing returns to scale. Epple and Romano
(1996) do not specify the private sector market structure.
13In other words, ¯xed costs are covered by ad hoc lump sum taxes. This assumption has no
qualitative e®ect on the results.
14Fixing a minimal expenditure for public schools might imply a higher preferred tax, but it
would not qualitatively a®ect the outcome. Having total income shared between vouchers and
public school would reduce tractability without adding special insights.
48. The value v of vouchers and agents eligible to use them are exogenously
determined. The public cost of vouchers is nvv, where nv is the number of
people using vouchers in equilibrium.15
By assumption 6, total public (variable) expenditure (c1 + c2np)npXP + nvv
must equal tax proceeds t!. Rearranging the budget constraint, the quality of





where g = (c1 + c2np) is the per-pupil cost of one unit of public education. Since
XP cannot be negative, we must ensure that t! ¸ nvv. The convexity assumption
plays an important role in the model. I discuss my choice in appendix A, where I
also introduce an alternative assumptions leading to similar results with a linear
cost function.
2.1 Households' behaviour
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R is the optimal level of consumption of private education. Not
pro¯ting from public education, his preferred tax rate if he uses vouchers is
t = nvv
! (the minimum tax to ¯nance them) and t = 0 otherwise. His utility
is strictly decreasing with the tax.
² The utility function of an agent of income ! attending public school is
U(XP;b); replacing b with the after tax income and XP with Equation 1,
15Voting over the tax to ¯nance school only, excluding vouchers' value and who is eligible, is
not just a simplifying assumption. The voting mechanism is intended as a way to predict the
attitude of an \o±ce-motivated" politician. Voters are interested in general policies (such as
the share of GDP devoted to education), while they do not have a clear position on technical
problems (such as the value of the voucher) requiring the collection of much information. For
instance, the Swiss referendum was only on the introduction of vouchers. Their value and who
could pro¯t from them were chosen by politicians.
16Remember that the price of private education q is normalised to 1.
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maximises agent's utility.
The preferred tax depends on income; from the FOC changes are measured impli-
citly. By the separability of U,
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22 < UP
2 .17
Both conditions, widely accepted in the literature, refer to agents attending
public school; I assume that the SDI assumption holds. This assumption means
that the marginal utility of education is larger than that of the numeraire for low
income voters, and smaller for high income agents. As a consequence, richer people
are less eager to substitute units of the numeraire for education.
Each agent chooses between public and private school by comparing the two
levels of utility that he can attain. It is possible to identify the \indi®erent vo-
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The identity of b ! depends on public school quality and thus on the equilibrium
tax t. Since the equilibrium tax depends on the identity of the pivotal voter !, it
is more precise to denote the indi®erent voter by b !(!).
From the following two lemmas, once we identify the indi®erent voter, all richer
agents attend private school and the others attend public school.18
Lemma 1 In a given interval ! 2 [®;'] and for ® < ¯ < ', if the agent ! = ¯
prefers the private system so do all those richer than him (i.e., ! 2 [¯;']).
Lemma 2 Similarly to the previous lemma, if ! = ¯ prefers the public system, so
do all the poorer agents (i.e., ! 2 [®;¯]).
The intuition is that the choice between public and private education depends
on the marginal rate of substitution (monotone in income) between education and
the numeraire. When an agent is su±ciently rich for private school to be preferable
(because the reduction in consumption of b has minor e®ects), this is true a fortiori
17For more on the SRI and SDI assumptions, see Epple and Romano (1996).
18This is true, provided we compare agents all receiving a voucher or if none of them did it.
6for all richer agents. Similarly, if an agent prefers public school, then poorer people
prefer it too.
Figure 1: Moving from public to private school: Engel's and indi®erence curves
The indi®erent agent can choose between two bundles: attending public school
(point 4 in Figure 1) he can consume more of the numeraire but less education
than desirable (point 3) and vice versa (the centre and left charts in ¯g. 1 show the
jump in consumption), since agents pay the tax ¯nancing the public school also
when attending private school. From the sketch of the indi®erence curves (right
chart in Figure 1),19 for an agent with low income (! < ^ !), and in particular
for the median voter, it is preferable to attend public school (2 Â 1). Voter ^ !
is indi®erent between public and private instruction (3 »^ ! 4). Finally, for those
agents with su±ciently large income (! > ^ !), the point of tangency suggests that
the private schooling is preferred.
Before considering the solution of the model, I consider the situation when vou-
chers are not available, a benchmark to study the consequences of the introduction
of vouchers.
3 The benchmark case: no vouchers
Absent vouchers, this model di®ers from Epple and Romano (1996) only in that the
cost function parameters can di®er from the public to the private sector.20 Equili-
brium results for the no-voucher case are denoted by the superscript nv. Equation
19The vertical dashed line in correspondence to the point Xp shows the possibility of consump-
tion jump when switching from private to public school. The dotted line represents, with homo-
thetic preferences, the income expansion path.
20For more details and proofs of this section results, the reader can see Epple and Romano
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Figure 2: Preferred tax under SDI and no voucher (linear proxy)
Under the SDI assumption, the median voter is pivotal (! = !med) (see Figure
2).21 This means that the voting outcome in the no-voucher case is tnv = t(!med);
all and only agents with income lower than the indi®erent voter b ! attend pu-
blic school. The number of households attending public school is nnv
p (tnv) =
R b !
!min f(!)d! = F (b !).22
Compared to Epple and Romano (1996), public and private school prices (res-
pectively g and q) can di®er. Their results for the SDI case hold assuming g = q.
When g 6= q, their results are still qualitatively applicable; but the identity of the
indi®erent voter changes. Relative to Epple and Romano (1996), if g > q, the
quality of public school is lower, and so is b ! (i.e., the indi®erent agent is poorer);
the opposite is true for g < q.
4 Introducing vouchers
Agents with income below !v
max = b !(tnv(!med)) are entitled to use a voucher of
magnitudev = tnv!
nnv
p if they attend a private school;23 the two values were arbi-
trarily chosen: v is equal to the voucher-absent average cost of a public school
21The preferred tax is weakly decreasing in income; t < t(!med) cannot be an equilibrium
because households with income ! < !med prefer t(!med), nor can t > t(!med), which is defeated
by a majority including agents with income ! ¸ !med.
22Agents take nnv
p (thus the quality of public instruction) as given and vote for the tax level.
In equilibrium, the proportion of voters opting for public services coincides with agents' expecta-
tions. Glomm and Ravikumar (1998)'s proposition 2 (proving that a value for nnv
p always exists
that solves 3 and that this value is unique) holds in this framework. Glomm and Ravikumar
(1998)'s proposition 2 holds under not restrictive conditions: the cumulative density function
F(!) has to be continuous and increasing in !.
23By the decreasing returns to scale assumption, the value of the voucher is strictly smaller












max is the income of the indi®erent agent under no vouchers. This
ensures that agents attending private schools anyway are not subsidised, and it
simpli¯es comparisons with the no-voucher framework.













We expect some of the agents entitled to receive a voucher to shift to the
private sector. This implies a reduction in congestion. Thus, the quality of public
school increases, possibly attracting some students who previously attended private
schools.
Since the price of private education is no longer the same for all agents, we
identify up to two possible indi®erent agents: one among voters receiving vouchers
and another within the others.
It is preferable to consider the two groups [!min;!v
max] and [!v
max;!max] sepa-
rately. Lemmas 1 and 2 allow us to construct four (possibly empty) subsets:24 in
particular, for each of the two previous groups of agents, some voters may prefer
public education and others the private one.
b !L(t) 2 [!min;!v
max] is the income level for which
U
R ((1 ¡ t)! ¡ X
¤








while b !R(t) 2 [!v
max;!max] is such that
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Equations 5 and 6 mean that agents with income b !L and b !R are indi®erent between
private and public education; b !L + v · b ! · b !R.
Figure 3 shows how utility changes with income for an agent attending private
or public school, both with and without vouchers. The quality of public school in
the graph is ¯xed and Xp > Xnv
p .
If UR(! + v) and UP(Xp;!) were crossing to the right with respect to UR(!)
and UP(Xnv
p ;!), than b !L would be greater than b ! and would not belong to the
required interval; all agents in [!min;!v
max] would attend public school. Likewise,
all agents with income greater than b ! prefer private education when UR(!) and
24Later, I state the existence conditions for the indi®erent agents and the bounds of the four
subsets'.
9Figure 3: How utility changes with income
UP(Xp;!) do not cross to the right of b !. When both thresholds exist, there are
four groups of agents, whose preferred choice is represented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Intervals and choices
Given b !L and b !R,25 the number of agents using the voucher in equilibrium is
nv =
R b !(tnv)








The following propositions prove that b !L 2 [!min;!v
max] and b !R 2 [!v
max;!max].
Proofs follow in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 For all t 2 (0;1) and ! 2 R++, there always exists a value for
np 2 (0;1) for which the number of people willing to attend public school is equal
to the one that agents anticipate to solve their maximisation problem.
Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The tax preferred by an agent of given income falls if, ceteris
paribus, the quality of public school increases.
25The share nnv
p of people attending public school under no-voucher is de¯ned on page 8.
10Corollary 1 The same pivotal voter might choose di®erent tax rates according to
the framework. If Xp > Xnv
p , then t(!med) < tnv(!med).
If the quality of public schooling increases by the introduction of vouchers, then
the tax burden decreases when the median voter is pivotal under both regimes.
Corollary 1 has an important welfare implication, since a reduction in t generates
an increase in all agents' welfare, including private school students.
Proposition 3 If b !L = b !, then b !R = b ! and we are back to the case without
vouchers. Moreover it cannot be that b !L > b !.
Intuitively, an agent who (voucher-absent) prefers private school, move to the
public sector only if the quality of public school increased. Public school at-
tendance in the vouchers regime is weakly smaller than in the no-voucher one:
gnp · gnvnnv
p with strict inequality if b !L < b !. As long as (and only when) b !L < b !,
the introduction of vouchers modi¯es the equilibrium, reducing the number of
public school students.
Proposition 4 b !R > b ! if and only if XP > Xnv
p : some agents move, after the
introduction of vouchers, from the private to the public sector, only if the quality of
public school increased as a consequence of the change. If Xp · Xnv
p , then b !R = b !.
The median voter's preferred tax is the largest supported by at least half of
the population); the equilibrium one can never be larger. Since b !R > b ! only when
Xp > Xnv
p , if we observe b !R > b !, the total number of agents attending public
school is necessarily smaller than without vouchers (np < nnv
p ).
Proposition 5 Public-school-quality at the equilibrium under vouchers is always
greater or equal to the one without vouchers (given the tax rate), i.e., Xp ¸ Xnv
p ,
with strict inequality when b !L < b !.
Proof. See the Appendix for the proofs.
By propositions 1 to 5, there are two possible scenarios after introducing vou-
chers: a) nobody uses vouchers and the introduction does not a®ect agents in the
economy, that is b !L = b !R = !v
max; or b) the richest people entitled to use vouchers
and the poorest who are not eligible both adjust their behaviour: b !L < !v
max < b !R.
115 The vote over the tax
Households chose the tax rate through a majority vote. Agents' preferred tax de-
pends on the choice between public and private education, and on the opportunity
to receive a voucher. Recall that:
² the preferred tax rate is decreasing in income (SDI assumption).
² the preferred tax is t = 0 for private school students not using vouchers.
² t = nvv
! is the preferred tax of private school students using vouchers. This
is the tax needed to ¯nance vouchers.26 With this level of taxation, strictly
lower than the one preferred by any public school student, public education
disappears.
The voting outcome depends on the distribution of income and on whether the
median voter attends public school. I analyse the following cases separately: i)
(Subsection 5.1) where the median voter attends public school after the introduc-
tion of vouchers (b !L ¸ !med) and vouchers induce a Pareto improvement; and ii)
(Subsection 5.2) where the median voter uses the voucher to move to the private
sector (b !L < !med) and we observe a Pareto improvement only if the public school
system does not collapse.
5.1 The median voter attends a public school (b !L ¸ !med)
Focusing on when b !L 2 [!med; b !),27 the outcome of the vote is precisely t = t(!med).
Agents with income ! < !med (half of the population) ask for a tax increase with
respect to t = t(!med), while the others favour a decrease in the equilibrium tax:
the median voter is pivotal. Figure 5 represents agents' preferred tax in the case
of vouchers when b !L ¸ !med.
Even though the median voter is decisive, his preferred tax rate is lower than
in the no-voucher case by Proposition 2: t(!med) < tnv(!med). The public budget
constraint is relaxed and the quality of public school necessarily increases.28 This
e®ect is partially o®set by the arrival of new students, who previously attended
private school and are attracted by the higher public school quality; the subset
26Vouchers' value is ¯xed; voting for a larger tax rate is not rational.
27If b !L = b ! (i.e., vouchers are not attractive), we are back to the no-voucher case (proposition
3).
28Since the voucher's value is below marginal cost, convincing students to move to the private
sector relaxes the public budget constraint, increasing the quality of the public service.
12Figure 5: Agents' preferred tax
! 2 [b !; b !R] is non-empty. By Proposition 4, the number of agents moving out
from public school is larger than the number of students moving into it and the
¯nal e®ect is an increase in the quality of the public service (¯nanced through tax
proceeds net of vouchers expenditure).
From a welfare standpoint, we observe a Pareto improvement. The quality
of public schools increases when vouchers are introduced, making public school
students better o®. Moreover, the tax burden falls, so all citizens are better o®. By
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP), all agents changing behaviour
while the previous bundle is still a®ordable must be better o®.
To be more rigorous, for b !L < b !, utility increases for all agents when introdu-
cing vouchers:
² [!min; b !L]: these agents always opt for public school. The quality of public
school increases (Proposition 5). Since their disposable income and the public
school quality increase, their utility increases as well.
² [b !L; b !R): they either move from public to private education, using vouchers,
or from private to public (! 2 (b !; b !R)). For all of them, the bundle previously
consumed is still a®ordable. They all have a larger disposable income and
the quality of public school increased. If they modify their choice, the new
bundle is preferred to the previous one by WARP.
² [b !R;!max]: all the agents in this interval attend private school in both cases.
The price that they pay to attend private school is the same, and the tax
decreases. As a consequence, they are better o® in the voucher case.
13To sum up, when the introduction of vouchers is ine®ective (i.e., b !L = b ! = b !R),
agents are indi®erent, and for b !L 2 [!med; b !), the selective voucher system strictly
Pareto dominates the no-voucher system.
5.2 The median voter attends a private school (b !L < !med)
According to the density function f(!), the number of people a®ected by the
introduction of vouchers (! 2 [b !L; b !R] ) varies, as does the number of agents
willing to use vouchers in equilibrium. The consequence of introducing vouchers
depends on how many agents move to private schooling.
If b !L(!med) < !med, the poorest part of the population (which attends public
school) cannot form a majority coalition. The shift from public to private induced
by vouchers (ceteris paribus) increases the quality of public service, which attracts
a group of voters (! 2 [!; b !R]) previously attending a private school. Two scenarios
can occur depending on whether or not those willing to attend public school make




b ! f(!)d! ¸ 50%). The
value of vouchers and f(!) jointly determine which is the relevant scenario.29
Let us de¯ne the pivotal voter as
! =
½









where we restrict the existence of ! to the interval (b !; b !R], to ensure that he is
attending a public school.30 Intuitively, the income ! represents the agent whose
preferred tax is the \median preferred-tax". Agents' preferred tax is summarised
in Figure 6.
The existence of ! implies that a coalition of public school students set the
equilibrium tax and that the group in favour of having no tax does not in°uence
the vote outcome. If no one income ful¯ls the requirements in Equation 8, the tax
is chosen by the group of agents attending private school and pro¯ting from the
voucher (and set to the minimum level to ¯nance vouchers: t = nvv
! ).
The equilibrium when the majority of voters attend public school By
construction, ! is pivotal: agents with income in the interval [!min; b !L] [ [b ! ;!]
29Note that in all countries in which vouchers have been introduced, public school attendance
exceeds half of the population. For instance, in Chile, where vouchers' value was set slightly below
the average cost of students attending public school (OECD (1998)), private school attendance




b ! f(!)d! = 50% is equivalent to
R !med
b !L f(!)d! =
R !
b ! f(!)d!.
14Figure 6: Agents' preferred tax
(representing half of the population) prefer a tax rate larger than the one chosen
by !. Agents in [b !L; b !] and [!; b !R] ask for a lower but positive tax rate; the
remaining (! > b !R) ask for no tax at all. By the SDI assumption, since ! > !med,
the equilibrium tax decreases with respect to those in Sections 3 and 5.1.
From Equation 8, b ! < ! · b !R. By Proposition 4 we can conclude that
quality of public education has necessarily increased and, thus, that a strict Pareto
improvement occurred.
All agents' disposable income increases (t(!) < tnv(!med)); agents attending a
private school (i.e., ! 2 [b !L; b !] and ! > b !R) are better o® with vouchers. The
poorest agents (! < b !L) are also better o®, since they pay less in taxes and receive
a better public service.
People in ! 2 [b !; b !R] could stick to the private market and consume a better
bundle with respect to the one consumed without vouchers (since the tax decrea-
sed); if they move to the public sector, the WARP allows us to conclude that they
are better o®.
Because all agents are strictly better o®, we conclude that the introduction of
vouchers leads to a strict Pareto improvement.
The equilibrium when the majority of voters do not attend public school
When agents willing to attend public school are less than 50%, the decisive voter
belongs to the group of private school students pro¯ting from the voucher. The








Every former student of the public school receives the average social cost of a
public student in the no voucher case.
For this solution to represent a stable equilibrium, at least half of the population
has to be better o®; otherwise, this tax rate cannot win against the proposal of
having no vouchers. All people with income ! > b ! are indi®erent, since the tax
does not change with respect to the benchmark.
People with income ! 2 [b !L; b !] are always better o® (by WARP).
Concerning people with income ! < b !L, they all receive the same voucher, to
be spent for private education. There are three possible frameworks:
1. The private school market price (q) is lower than the average cost of produ-
cing public education (AC(XP)) in the no-voucher case. It is socially optimal
to dismantle the public school and distribute vouchers. Agents are better
o®, this solution is a Pareto improving, and public schooling disappears.
2. q = AC(XP). Agents are indi®erent. This equilibrium weakly Pareto domi-
nates the no-voucher case and public schooling disappears.
3. q > AC(XP). Voters with income ! < b !L are worse o® (their consumption
of the numeraire is constant, but they receive worse educational service).
A minority of the population is worse o® (! < b !L), another is better o®
(! 2 [b !L; b !]) and the remainder (! > b !) is indi®erent. For this framework
to constitute an equilibrium (i.e., for voters to accept the introduction of
vouchers), at least half of voters should agree on vouchers, which means that
a substantial part of the richest agents must form a coalition with the middle
class against the lower class.
6 Conclusions
Consider proposing to students in public school a voucher of value below the per
student cost of providing free public education to be used to attend a private
school. For each student opting for a private school, the government incurs in
a net saving, which can be redistributed among all voters. Some agents accept
the voucher because, by attending a private school, they choose the quality of
instruction while public school only provides one level.
I investigate the implications of introducing selective vouchers and, in particu-
lar, whether the majority of voters would accept this change. I show that:
161. the usual conclusion that the median voter is always decisive under SDI is
not robust with regard to the introduction of vouchers.
2. in addition to the known coalition types (poor versus rich, or middle class
versus the others), a third type of coalition can form. The middle class splits
in two groups: the bottom one joins the richest agents, to ask for a reduction
in taxes. Meanwhile, the top one forms a coalition with the poorest voters
in order to increase taxes.
3. introducing selective vouchers induces a Pareto improvement unless i) this
provokes the public sector collapse; and ii) the market price of private edu-
cation is higher than the average cost of producing public education; in this
case, the poorest in the population are hurt by vouchers.
4. a large majority should always support selective vouchers.
5. the middle class is the group that directly pro¯ts from vouchers; the poorest
class bears their costs when public education disappears. The richest class
weakly pro¯ts from the introduction of vouchers (through tax reductions).
The introduction of vouchers should never harm society (unless public school
collapses), provided that the mechanism is properly designed. This result depends
on the initial speci¯cations: 1) it is not harmful for society to have people attending
the school of their choice;31 and 2) peer e®ects are irrelevant (alternatively, peer
e®ects have a linear impact on instruction).
Introducing selective vouchers of ¯xed amount implies a jump in utility (i.e.,
a distortion) for agents whose income is close to the threshold for eligibility. This
is a structural problem of selective vouchers that can be avoided through intro-
ducing vouchers that are regressive in income. Further research may investigate
the conditions under which such vouchers would be compatible with public budget
constraint and induce an increase in welfare.
The introduction of vouchers increases integration in a strati¯ed society, increa-
sing the variance in wealth among students in the same school (making private
schools accessible to poorer people and public schools more attractive for wealthier
people).
From these results, voters should welcome the introduction of vouchers. Ne-
vertheless, in many countries (especially in Europe), vouchers are not popular, as
31For instance, if a school were less e®ective in the spread of knowledge, increasing its market
share might have a negative impact on productivity, growth, etc.
17demonstrated by the results of the Swiss referendum and the Italian debate over
the last years. A combination of di®erent factors may have generated this aver-
sion. Private institutes can have religious or political orientations. Vouchers are
sometimes perceived as a subsidy to a speci¯c credo or as a way to di®use speci¯c
cultures or principles, rather than a way to enlarge agents' possibility set.
Furthermore, often universal vouchers have been proposed. These are more
likely to decrease the quality of public service and reduce redistribution.
Finally, a more substantial problem concerns the value of the voucher. A
voucher of a small amount is ine®ective, and a too large amount implies that
public provision is no longer supported by the majority of the population. In my
model, the value of the voucher is set exogenously at a value that relaxes the public
budget constraint when some students participate. It would be of interest, in future
research, to compute the optimal value of the voucher and the one preferred by
the majority.
Appendix
A On the convexity of the cost function
Assumption 4 requires the cost function to be convex in the number of students
(I use a strictly convex function, but local convexity, in a neighbourhood of the
equilibrium, would be su±cient). Appendix A has two objectives: ¯rstly (A.1) I
show that convexity is an empirically relevant feature; empirical results are very
controversial and I do not claim that the cost function is always convex. Still, I can
show that convexity seems the most plausible assumption in some contexts. Then
I show (A.2) that convexity is less crucial than it appears. I provide the intuition
for an alternative model leading to very similar results, to prove that convexity
could be replaced by other assumptions without a®ecting results.
A.1 The empirical results on convexity
Convexity can occur at the district or at the school level; in my model, the two
coincide (only one school is present). This makes sense in a local perspective
(considering a public school and its neighbourhood), or under a medium term
time horizon (free markets adjust rapidly, changing the number or location of
public schools is longer and more complex, involving the cooperation of di®erent
bodies and possibly involving di®erent jurisdictions).
18Incompatibility in results about convexity could derive from the di±culty to
de¯ne and measure school quality (Heinesen (2005)). A second problem is the
district size: the shape of the cost function might di®er for small districts: a
discontinuity in the function could explain this; alternatively, decreasing returns
to scale might occur only after a given scale (Galles and Sexton (1995)).
Picard (2003)'s technical report includes a survey on the advantages and di-
sadvantages of large districts and on the presence of (dis)economies of scale.
Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1995) show that of all the districts in the New
York area, only some among those with less than 500 students would experience
economies of scale. Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger (2002) also support the
conjecture that scale economies are present for su±ciently small districts, while
sizeable diseconomies of scale appear for large districts (above 15000 students).
Following Heinesen (2005), there is some consensus on the presence of scale eco-
nomies (at least for small districts) when estimating the cost function, while the
same is not true when estimating the school production function, that is, when
the outcome is school quality (as in my model). Heinesen (2005) reports of several
papers32 supporting the idea of decreasing returns to scale. Results in Ruggiero
(1999) are even stronger: even without assumptions on public authorities' e±-
ciency, the cost frontier is convex.
Empirical ¯ndings at the school and class level are not more clear cutting.
Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) seem to support
the idea of a convex cost function. On the role of classes size in education e®ecti-
veness, Lazear (2001) writes that \Blake (1954) summarised a literature where 35
studies found smaller class size was better, 18 found larger class size was better,
and 32 were inconclusive."
The precise de¯nition of educational services plays a major role in that. When
considering teaching, a non-convex cost function is more likely. Conversely, mo-
dern schools provide numerous facilities including libraries, computer rooms, sport
facilities, etc, often showing non linear costs. Transportation costs, in particular,
matter in the choice of the optimal size of a school.
Smet (2001) considers education in Belgium. Separating the cost of teaching
from the other education related costs (transportation costs, in particular), Smet
shows that the cost function is U-shaped. Consequently, there is an optimal size
for schools, and the cost of education increases more than proportionally with the
number of students, when the size of a school is excessive; especially because, for
32Driscoll, Halcoussis, and Svorny (2003), Ferguson (1991), Jacques, Brorsen, and Richter
(2000), Kiesling (1967), Niskanen (1998), Walberg and Fowler Jr. (1987).
19a given distribution of the population, increasing the school size implies to attract
students with larger transportation costs.
Chubb and Moe (1990), about the state of New York, conclude that public
schools are not e±cient and the size of school is not optimally chosen. Kokkelenberg,
Dillon, and Christy (2008) conclude that \there are diseconomies of scale with a
deterioration of the school quality outcome as class sizes grow larger".
Concluding, both at the school and district level, the empirical literature cannot
provide a unique answer about the shape of the cost function. Fixed costs and
some e±ciencies in agglomerating call for su±ciently large schools and districts,
but after a given threshold, diseconomies are not unfrequent in some countries.
The way the educational bundle is de¯ned has an impact on results: considering
only the teaching service, the cost function seems to be more concave. Considering
education (as in my model) as a consumption good, the impact on the cost function
of complementary services (transport, organisational and security costs, etc.), a
convex function seems more appropriate.
A.2 Getting rid of convexity: intuition of an alternative
model
The convexity assumption is not as crucial as it might appear at ¯rst sight. This
subsection is meant to give an intuition of one alternative model in which, with a
linear cost function, the introduction of selective vouchers lead to a Pareto impro-
vement. This is not a standing alone model, I simply describe the framework and
the underlying mechanism.
Since private schools are costly, why some people attend them? One possibility
is that they provide a better service (vertical di®erentiation); I rather consider a
case of horizontal di®erentiation. If private schools provide additional services
di®erently valuable to the population (religion or ethnical classes, for instance),
the willingness to pay for private school di®ers from an agent to another.
Assume that the education production function exhibits constant marginal
costs; quality depends on the per capita expenditure. Suppose, for instance, that in
public schools the national language is used as the o±cial language of instruction,
while private schools propose a broad set of languages of instruction. While quality
(and thus the production cost) is the same, the utility for citizens of attending a
private school might change. Types determine how agents value the opportunity
to choose the language of instruction. For simplicity, assume that richer people
value more the freedom of choice, which means that the willingness to pay for
20private school increases in income.
I now de¯ne two agents (or level of income) that are crucial for the following
explanation. The ¯rst is the usual indi®erent voter, denoted by ^ !. The second one
is the agent that (equalising the marginal utility of education and of the numeraire)
would ¯nd it optimal to use all his disposable income for the numeraire and to
consume exactly the level of education provided by public school (by the voting
mechanism to choose the tax rate, this agent is the decisive/pivotal agent): I denote
this voter as !d. The pay-twice system for which private school students pay both
the tax to ¯nance public school and the tuition, implies that the indi®erent voter
has a marginal utility of private education larger than its marginal cost, because
of the outside opportunity of attending public school for free (net of the sunk cost
of the tax).
Private education, for a same level of quality (and thus of expenditure), gua-
rantees a larger utility (because it allows to choose the language of instruction).
Therefore, agent !d can be made indi®erent with a voucher that allows him to
keep his expenditure for the numeraire constant and to consume a speci¯c level
of education, which is lower than the one of public school, thus cheaper, but that
gives the same level of utility (because of the increase in freedom). Consequently,
the voucher can be of strictly smaller value than the cost of providing public edu-
cation. The indi®erent voter, by de¯nition, is indi®erent between attending public
or private school, therefore, it is possible to convince him to attend a private school
at no expense. The cost of convincing an agent to opt out of the public system
is decreasing in income. Proposing to all agents in public school the voucher that
that makes !d indi®erent, agents with income ! 2 (!d; ^ !) use the voucher to move
to a private school; the public sector saves (for each of these agents) the di®erence
between the marginal cost of a student in the public school and the value of the
voucher. The savings would imply, in the voting equilibrium, an increase in the
quality of public school, and a decrease in the tax rate. Consequently all agents
would be better o®.
B The e®ects of a change in the tax
Most variables are a®ected by changes in the income tax. Intuitively, if the tax rate
falls, the ¯rst impact on the model is that public investment in education (t!) falls,
and agents' disposable income ((1¡t)!) increases. Both e®ects imply that opting
for private school becomes more attractive. Concerning the ¯rst e®ect, the reasons
21are obvious, while for the second one, they are slightly more subtle: an increase in
the disposable income leads to an increase in the consumption of b for everybody,
but since the quantity of b consumed by people attending public school is higher,
by the concavity of the utility function, the increase in utility for people attending
public school is lower than the utility for those preferring private education. Since
private school becomes more attractive, a greater number of agents switch from the
public to the private system (which means that the income of the two indi®erent
voters decreases). The number of voters using vouchers increases, tightening even
more the public budget constraint. Simultaneously, with the number of people
attending public school having fallen, the per-capita public expenditure increases
(since gnp drops), making public education more attractive.
To summarise, the impact on the quality of public school from a change in
the tax is a priori undetermined: the budget available for public school is lower;
meanwhile, the number of people attending public school decreases (both because
public school becomes less attractive and because agents' disposable income in-
creases). When
@Xp
@t ¸ 0, it means that a reduction in the tax rate decreases public
expenditure for education and the consequent shrinkage in the number of people
attending public school is not enough to o®set it (demand for public school is in-
elastic); thus, the per-capita expenditure will also plunge. The reverse is true for
@Xp
@t < 0.
C Proof of Proposition 1
At equilibrium, np has to solve two equations. On one side, it is equal to the
fraction of agents for whom the utility of attending a public school is larger than
the utility of opting out of it, thus np = ¹f! : UP(t;!;!;np) ¸ UR(t;!;v),
where ¹ is the probability measure associated with the distribution function. On
the other hand (Equation 7), the number of agents with income in the interval
[!min; b !L] [ [b !; b !R] must be the same as the value for np used by agents to solve
their maximisation problem.
Equating the two, we obtain ¹f! : UP(t;!;!;np) ¸ UR(t;!;v) = F(b !L) +
(F(b !R)¡F(b !)). Simple computations show that the left-hand side of the equation
is decreasing in both b !L and b !R while the right-hand side is increasing. Since F is
a continuous (and strictly increasing) function and since, for np = 0, the left-hand
side is always larger than the right-hand side, a unique solution exists (¯xed point
theorem).
22D Proof of Proposition 2
For a given revenue e !, the preferred tax t(e !) = argmax
t
UP(t!¡nvv
gnp ;(1¡t)e !). If, for
any reason, the ¯rst argument (Xp) increases, its marginal utility of education (U
p
1)
decreases. At equilibrium, the optimal tax by de¯nition equalises the marginal




2), which means that the marginal utility of the
numeraire falls (thus, the numeraire consumption has to increase) and thus the
tax drops.
E Proof of Proposition 3
If b !L = b !, nobody uses the voucher, nv = 0 and Xp = !tnv
gnp . The number of
students attending public school cannot be lower than in equilibrium in the no-
voucher case, which implies that gnp ¸ gnvnnv
p . This makes public school (weakly)
less attractive than in the no-voucher case, so all the households with income
! > b ! (who were already preferring the private system) con¯rm their choice. If
XR Â! XP for all ! > b !, then gnvnnv
p = gnp and thus Xv
p = Xp and we are back
to the equilibrium case without vouchers.
Finally, it cannot be that b !L > b !. This would result in nv = 0 and gvnv
p = gnp;
this would imply that Xnv
P = XP and thus that b !L = b !, which is a contradiction.
This proves that b !L · b ! in all cases.
F Proof of Proposition 4
XP > Xnv
P ( b !R > b !: if b !R > b ! , agents in the interval (b !; b !R) are attending
public school in the presence of vouchers while they were attending private schools
before. The introduction of vouchers does not imply changes in the disposable
income of agents with income above b !; thus the original consumption bundle
remains a®ordable. By the WARP, if we observe a change in this agents' behaviour,
it must be that the new bundle is preferred. Since the numeraire consumption
is constant, it must be that the quality of school consumed has increased, thus
XP > XR > Xnv
P .
Xnv
P = XP ) b !R = b !: when Xnv
P = XP, for agents in (b !;!max] nothing has
changed. By simply replacing XP by Xnv
P in equation 6, we are back to the
condition in equation 3, and thus, by de¯nition, the solution of the problem is b !.
XP > Xnv
P ) b !R > b !: by de¯nition, b !R is the level of income for which the left-
23and right-hand sides of Equation 6 are equal. For Xnv
P = XP, b !R = b !. Increasing
XP, public school becomes more attractive (i.e., the right-hand side is bigger than
the left-hand side). Only an increase in the level of income can re-establish the
equality. Such an increase leads to a higher consumption of the numeraire both
in the case of consumption of public school and that of private school; given the
concavity of the utility function, the marginal increase is higher on the left-hand
side than on the right-hand side, which ensures that for a su±ciently large increase
in b !R, the equality holds once again.
G Proof of Proposition 5
By Proposition 3, b !L cannot be greater than b !. Two di®erent scenarios are pos-
sible: b !L = b ! or b !L < b !.
Proof by contradiction. Suppose b !L < b ! and XP · Xnv
P : by Proposition 4,
b !R = b ! and thus a) np = (np(tnv) ¡ nv), b) !med is decisive, c) t > tnv and d)













a necessary condition for that (since t > tnv) is npg + nvgnv > nnv
p gnv: For this
to be true it must be that g > gnv which is impossible.
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